








capacityfor self-detenninationto developtheparticularconceptionof welfare





of womento an inferiorclassof persons.It thenconcludesthathisdefenseof
genderdifferencespermeatesthewholeof his theoryto theextenthatit does
notallowfor a feministappropriation.1




contributedlo thedevelopmentof feministethicsconceivedof it asa counter-
pointto Kant's moralphilosophy.This is speciallythecaseof theproponents
of the"careethics"movement,for whomtheobjectof feministethicsconsists
in theanalysisof aspecificallyfemininewaytodealwithmoraldilemmas.2
The thirdapproachtakesa quitedifferentdirectionin thatit purportsto
drawheavilyon Kant's conceptionof morality.It recognizesitsdebtto Kant
anddefendstheutilityof hisconceptionfor feminismthrougha peculiaread-



















argumentwiIl proceedin thefoIlowingmanner.First, I will dealwith a non-
avoidablefact,Kant'smisogyny,andcornmenton theimplicationsof his the-
oryof genderin thelightofhis defenseofformaluniversalismoSecond,Kant's
centralideasconcemingfreedom,goodness,andhappinesswill be introduced.
Theaimof thissectionwiIl betocorrectIyunderstandthecoreof thecategori-
calimperative.Third,I wiIl dealwithDrucillaComeIl'sinterpretationofKant.
In herbook"At theHeartofFreedom",sheemploysaparticularviewof
autonornyandhappinessthatsheattributeslo Kant,andthenappliesit to gen-
der issues.This paperarguesthatherreadingof Kant is fundamentaIlyrnis-
takenand,hence,thather conclusionsin relationto ferninismarenot truly
Kantian.FinaIly, thecentralargument- thatthe categoricalimperativecan
serveasan extremelyhelpfultool to evaluategenderissues- will be devel-
oped.This papercontributesto theeffortto displacean aIl-too-cornmonbut
misguidedinterpretationof theKantianprojectamongcontemporarygender
approaches,andthusto theexplorationof thewaysin whichferninismcould
benefitfromKant'smoralphilosophy.
Kant'stheoryof gender
Kant'smoralphilosophyaimsto be a uniqueinvestigationof morallife. The
philosopherof K5nigsbergtookit thatthereis morallife in ordinarysense,and
thatthereis a moralconsciousnesscornmonto all peopleandtimes,which is
independentof philosophicalresearch.Philosophicalanalysisof moral life
doesnotaddto norrestfromit. Ethicsservesmerelyto clarifytheessenceof
morality,(Le.,to definewhatit is, whereit lies,andhow it is possible).The
goalofphilosophicalstudyis thustodiscovera secureguidetomorality.Kant
conceivedof histaskastheisolationof thea priori,andthereforeunchanging,
elementsof morality.He talksabouttheconditionsfor thepossibilityof moral
life in a universalsense.In differentsocietiestheremightbe differentmoral
schemes,butif theyaIl representmoralmIes,thenit shouldbepossibleto find
outwhattheyhavein cornmon,thatis,whatit is thatmakesthemaIlbemoral.
His approachto moralityrefersto anidealof generalvalidity.The morallaw
mustbeentirelyunvarying.Thatis whythe"Foundationsof theMetaphysics
4 HertaNagl-Docekal (1998):FeministEthics:.How It Could Benefit from Kant's Moral
Philosophy. In: Robín May Schott,O.c.101-124.Joan Tronto (1987): Beyond Gender






It is thennecessaryto understandwhata goodwill is. The answer,in
Kantianterms,is: A goodwill is a will thathasasits intention(what1will to
do) tO'actaccordingto duty,andasa motive(why1will todo it) toactoutof
respectfor themorallaw.Kantdefendedthatwomencouldnotactin accor-
dancerwiththeidealtypeof morality.Only men,in hisview,couldactoutof
respectfor themorallaw, thatis, only mencoulddo goodoutof a senseof
duty.The detailsof his views,andthetheoreticallabyrinthsthatsustainthem,
cannotbeelaboratedhere.
An abundantliteratureon Kant's misogynyis available,however,and
concemsnotonly its influenceonhismoralthoughtbutalsocentralaspectsof
his aesthetics,anthropology,andpoliticaltheory.For thepurposesof thispa-




engagein deepdiscussionson mechanics,like Marchessde Chíitelet,wouldalso




"With regardto scholarlywomen,theyusetheirbookssomewhatlikea watch,that
is, theywearthewatchsoit canbenoticedthattheyhaveone,althoughit isusually
brokenordoesnotshowthecorrectime."9
"Womanis a domesticanimal.Man walksaheadwithhis weaponsin hand,and
womanfollowshimwiththeburdenofthehouseholdequipment."10
"Womenavoidevil,notbecauseit is unfair,butbecauseit is ugly;virtuousactions
arefor themthosewhoarebeautiful... Thefemalesexis insensitivetoeverything
thatis dutyorobligation.... Theydoathingonlybecausetheylikedoingit,andthe
skilllies in soorderingthingsthattheylikeonlywhatisgoOO.,,11
The abovearenot theonly sexistcornmentsKantmakesaboutthefeminine
essentialnature,women'slackof capacitytoactmorally,thekindof education
















Therecanbeno doubtof Kant'smisogynistcharacter,norof thesexist
elementwhichgroundshisconceptionofwomen'smorality.As wehaveseen,
he setslimitsto women'scapacityto enjoyan absolutegoodwill, sinceit is
alwaysto be expectedthatthey(morefrequently?always?)actaccordingto
theirinclinations,insteadof by a strictsenseof duty.Any readingof Kant's
moralwritings,however,will alsorevealthatthe idealof goodwill (a will
whichactsaccordingtodutyfromduty)is extremelydifficulttosatisfyin men
aswell.Thereasonbeingthatevenif they(of course!)havewhatis needed-
thatis, thecapacitytojudgeandactby generalprincipiesinsteadof by their
owninclinations-theydonotalwaysexerciseit.
After all, therearealsobadwills. Moreover,giventheimpossibilityof
achievingthecompletemoralself-knowledgethatcharacterizesKantianethics,
evenifthey actontheirsuperiorcapacity,theycanneverbesurewhetherthey
didsooutof dutyor by inclinationwhentheactionis in accordancewith the
morallaw.In otherwords,mencanneverhaveknowledgeof theirownmoral
quality;evenif theybehaverightlyin a moralsense,theywill neverachieve
certaintyof it. As a consequenceof thisqualification,fully displayinga good
will is, properlyspeaking,almostas difficult for menas it is for women,al-
thoughfordifferentreasons.
Nevertheless,it is alsotruethatKant'sviewof womendoesnotplaya




12 To provethispoint,it wouldbenecessarytodrawontheimplicationsthatarecontained
inthelatterquote(i.e.,theassociationofwomanwiththefeelingofthebeautifulratherthan
with thenotionof duty).The taskexceedsthe limitsof this paper,but the following
referencescanbe helpful:ÁngelesJ. Perona(1992):Sobreincoherenciasilustradas:una
figurasintomáticaen la universalidad.In: Celia Amorós (Ed.): Actas del Seminario
PermanenteFeminismoe Ilustración1988-1992.Madrid: Institutode Investigaciones
Feministasde la UniversidadComplutense,235-244.LuisaPosada(1992):Kant:De la
dualidadteórica ladesigualdadpráctica.In:o.c.245-253.
13 To thisrespect,Alicia Puleo(Ed.) (1996):FigurasdelOtroen la Ilustraciónfrancesa.
Madrid:EscuelaLibreEditorial.Alicia Puleo(1993):La Ilustraciónolvidada:La polémica
de los sexosen el siglo XVIII. Madrid:Anthropos.Mary Wollstonecraft(1989):A






Denunciationof Kant's patriarchalconstructionof gendercanneverthelessbe
consistentwithadefenseof someelementsofhis theory.For, independentlyof
whatKant,himself,thoughtaboutgenderdifferences,hismoralapproachpro-
videsfeminismwith importantemancipatorytools.Why is Kant's conceptof
moralityaninterestingtheoreticaltooltoanalyzegenderissues?Becauseit ap-
pealstouniversality.And thereasonwhyauniversalistethicsis interestingfor
feminismlies in the fact thatwhatit commandsit commandsfor everyone,
men and women,equally.Thus, whenwomen'sinherentequalityis recog-
nized,therecanbe no moraldistinctionattributedto genderdifferences.It is





hibits all of its liberatingandemancipatoryvirtuesonly if we are readyto




whichtojudgewhethertheintentionofmy action(whatI will to do) is in ac-
cordancewith themorallaw(whatI oughtto do).Therulehastheaspectofa
categoricalimperativeandcanappearundervariousformulations.The third
formulaof thecategoricalimperativexpressestheideathatweoughtto actin
sucha way thatOUT will, beingrational,couldtumintoa will thatestablishes
generallaws.The so-calledprincipIeof theautonomyimpliesthatthewill "is
notbeingsubjectedsimplyto law,butis sosubjectedthatit mustberegarded
asgivingitselfthelaw,andforthisveryreasonis subjectothelawof whichit
mayconsideritselftheauthor".]5
AccordingtoKant,whenthewill actsin thatway,it givesitselfthelaw










sireto satisfYa particularinterest,it will be whatanyrationalwill oughtto
will. As Kantsays,whatthatwill wills, will bepártof a universalkingdomof
endsthateveryrationalbeing,preciselybecausehe is rational,would alsobe
readytowill.
Thus,accordingto thethirdformula,thecategoricalimperativerequires
thatwe respecthehumanityinherentin everyhumanbeing(Le.,bothin my
ownpersonandin everyotherperson).Now, theprecepthatthehumanperson
oughttobevaluedalways"asanendin itself' is linkedto therecognitionthat
to be a person- contraryto beinga thing- impliestheability to determine
one'sownends:"Reason,therefore,relateseverymaximof thewill asgiving
universallawstoeveryotherwill andalsoto everyactiontowarditself;it does
sonotfor thesakeof anyotherpracticalmotiveor futureadvantagebutrather
fromtheideaof thedignityof a rationalbeingwho obeysno law exceptthat
whichhehimselfalsogives."16
Thus,thethirdformulaof moralityentailsthatto be a personmeansto
be competento determineone's endsfor oneself.The requiremento ac-
knowledgetheother'scapacityfor self-determinationleadsKantianethicsto
emphasizethatlo actmorallyright is not merelyto refrainfrom doing any
harmto others,butsomethingelseaswell. In thisrespect,Kant defendsthat
thecategoricalimperativemustnotbeconfusedwiththe"goldenrole",thatis,
with the"do-as-you-would-like-to-be-done"principIe.The inadequacyof the
goldenruleis thatit savesusworryingaboutdoinggoodtotheothersif we are
preparednotto askthemto dous anygood.The quote,thoughlong,is worth
mentioninghere:








orotherwiseviolatestherightsof manoNow althoughit is possiblethata universal
lawof natureaccording10thatmaximcouldexist,it is neverthelessimpossible10





himself,bysuchalawof naturespringingfromhisownwill, ofallhopeof theaidhe
desires."17
To fully graspthepointatstake,wehavetorememberthatwhilethesearchfor






theya11do haveby a necessityof nature.Thispurposeis happiness.,,18"Butit is a
misfortunethattheconceptof happinessis so indefinitethat.althougheachperson
wishe,Sto attainit. he canneverdefinitelyandself-consistentlystatewhatit is he
reallywishesandwills. Thereasonfor thisis thata11elementswhichbelonglo the
conceptofhappinessareempirical,(Le.•theymustbetakenfromexperience),while
for theideaof happinessanabsolutewhole,a maximum.of we11-beingis neededin
mypresentandin everyfuturecondition.Now it is impossiblevenforam9stclear-
sightedandmostcapablebut finitebeingto formherea definiteconceptof that
whichherea11yWillS.,,19
Thus Kant's argumentrestsin theobservationthat.while everybodyhasthe
facultyof self-determination.eachoneappliesit in a differentmanner,since
eachonechooseshisorherends"in thedark".
Takentogether,bothclaims- thatit is notenoughto just refrainfrom
impedingtheother'shappiness,andthateachsubjecthasaparticularapproach
tohappiness- havethefollowingconsequence.It is adutyto supportothersin
thepursuitof theirindividualideasof happiness(providedtheyarenotagainst
themorallaw);weoughttohelpothersachievetheirhappiness.Kantstatesthe
ideathatit is not enoughto simplyrefrainfromimpedingtheother'shappi-
ness,andthatoneoughtto activelycontributeto itsachievementandincrease.
"Now humanitycouldno doubtsubsistif everybodycontributednothingtothe
happinessof othersbutatthesametimerefrainedfromdeliberatelyimpairing
theirhappiness.This is,however,merelytoagreenegativelyandnotpositively
with humanityasanendin itselfunlesseveryoneendeavorsalso,so farasin
himlies,to furthertheendsof others.For theendsof asubjectwhois anendin
himselfmust,if thisconceptionis tohaveitsfull effectonme,bealso,asfaras
possible,myends.',zo
In sum,Kantianmoralitycombinesthefollowingtwoideas:On theone
hand, everybodyhas the facultyof self-determinationso thateachperson





20 Kant,Grundlegungoo., AK, N, 417-418.
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thertheothers'achievementof happiness.Havingdealtwithsomeof thelead-
ing argumentsconcemingKant's theoryof morals,it is timeto moveto the
thirdquestion,namely,why ComeU'sinterpretationof Kant is misguided.As
mentionedin theintroduction,I havechosenComeU'sview notonlybecause







and freedomshouldplay in individualaction.For her, the recognitionof
autonomyandindividualfreedomprotectanyagentfromthe illegitimatere-
strictionsthatotherpeoplemightexertoverheractions.The basicpremisein
herargumentis thattheindividualordinationof preferencesis not to be dis-
cussed,for thereis nocornmoninstancefromwhichto imposeauniquevision
of thegood.In otherwords,thereis no universalcriterionby which tojudge
eachsubject'snotionof goodness.ComeU'sapproachimpliesthattheindivid-







indeterminateconceptionof happiness;thusthenotionof goodis individual-
asComeUweUstates.On theotherhand,however,for Kant, a correctmoral
actionis nevergovemedbytheagent'snotionofhappiness,for theagentought
nottotakeintoaccountherownhappinesswhenjudgingwhatsheoughtto do.
As a consequenceof thesetwotheses,Kant sustainsthatalthoughthecontent
of happinessis notuniversal,goodmoralactionis oneandthesamefor every
humanbeing.In fact,thatis exactlytheessenceof Kantianethics:theclaim
thatthesupremeprincipIeof moralityis universalbecausethenotionof good
is basedon the agent'sreason,not on her inclinationtowardshappiness.
Henee,myeritieismof ComeUis that,againstherpurpose,herapproachgoes
directlyagainstheesseneeof Kantianethics,(Le.,forínaluniversalism).Since
formaluniversalismis theeoreof Kantianethies,it wiU be necessaryto eon-





Comell's feministprojectis insertedwithina certaininterpretationof thelib-
eraltradition,whoseforefathershelocatesin Kant,RawlsandDworkin.Her
mainconcemis with women'sfreedom,overandabovewhathasup to now
beenthemostfrequentdemandof feminism,Le., formalequalitywith men.
Accordingto Comell we haveto shiftthefocusso thatinsteadof beingcon-
cernedwiththekindof freedomthatis necessarytobeequal,westartfocusing
on thekindof equalitythatis necessarytobefree.It is abouttimethatwetalk
straightaboutwomen'sfreedomfor, "a person'sfreedomto pursueherown
happinessin herown way is crucialfor anyperson'sabilityto sharein life's
glories."21Comell defendsthatthenotionof freedomincludesthefreedomto
conceptualizegenderrelationsandto actin accordwith thero,andespecially
the freedomto reactagainstanykind of enforcedsexualchoiceor identity.
This extensivedetinitionof freedomis, accordingtoher,basedontheKantian
conceptionof afreesubjectasa self-determinatinga ent.
In particular,it is basedon theexistenceof whatshecalls,''theimagi-
narysphere".The imaginaryspherereferstoa spacewherewe(re)imagineand
(re)contigureourselves,thatis, a spacethatallowsus to defineandevaluate
who we would like to become.Comell's defenseof ''thesanctuaryof the
imaginarydomain"explicitlybuttressestherightto createourselvesassexual
beings- muchin linewithJudithButler'sapproach.Particularly,suchfreedom
includestherightnotto behaveaccordingto thedictatesof apre-defmedcon-
ceptionof femaleandmaleidentities.Therefore,therecognitionof freedom




Havinganalyzedtheideaof freedom,Comellis readyto takethesecond
stepin theargument,thatis, to considerthekindof equalitythatwill allowus
to exerciseour freedom.To thispurpose,sheengagesin a livelydiscussionof
a greatvarietyofloday's hotissues,for example,theregulationofprostitution,
therightsof rentalmothersandof adoptedchildren,thereformof familylaw,
thereactionaryfather'smovement,therightsanddutiesofparents,andtheifi-
temationalagendaof humanrights.Comell is consciousthatthetheoretical
frameworksheemploysdoesnot determinea uniquepositionin relationlo
eachoftheseissues,for thesameidealoffreedomandprotectionofthe imagi-
naryspherecouldgiverisetooppositeviewsaboutthem.However,sheclaims
thatuniversalizingthesphereof the imaginarycontributestirmlyto thedis-
cardingof stereotypicalanswers.Thehopebeingthat,by givinga freshimpe-
tusto thetraditionallinesof debate,newfoundationsfor futuredialoguescould
21 Comell,At theHeartof ..., 18.
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be established.Her reflectionsarea goodproof of whatshehopesforoThe
greatadvantageof herapproachis thatit helpsclearthepathof stagnantper-
spectives.Clearly,someoldthemesdeservenewapproaches.For, ifwe really
conceiveof freedomasrelatedto theself-determinationof one'sgoalsin life
andtheabilitytopursuethem,thenwewill havea powerfultoolto testgender
equality.Afterall, it is stillthecasethatmostwomendonotenjoyequalaccess
withmentothesameopportunities,resources,andmeansto developtheirca-
pabilitiesin linewith therecognitionof theirpersonality,andwith respecto
theirchosenwaysof life.Definitely,thestrengthof thisthesiscontinuesto be
revolutionary.
Freedomversushappiness
Ibus, Kant's influenceon Comell showsin her emphasison freedom,self-
determination,andautonomy,aswell as in herconsiderationof theimaginary
sphereastheemptyspace,whicheachsubjectfills on his/herown. The fact
thatwomenhavehistoricallybeendenied,in theoryaswell as in practice,the
appropriationof theseconcepts,makesnecessarytocontinuetoreflectonthem
andto demandthattheirapplicationbe universal.In my view, this aspectof
Comell's' appealto Kant is impeccable.However,two aspectsof Comell's
expositionarenotcoherentwithaKantianperspective.
First,Comellseemsto takefreedomfor granted,as if it werean onto-
logicalfeatureof anyhumanbeing.By contrast,Kantconceivesof freedomas
a conditionof possibilityfor morality;it is neithera givenontologicalfeature
noranidealtobefulfilledbysocialconditions.
In Kant'sview,theexistenceoffreedomcanootbeguaranteed;werather
haveto supposeit for moralityto be possible.It is just thispoint thatis the
transcendentale ementof Kant's theory,which oughtnot to be overlooked.
(More technically,we would saythatfreedomis a ''postulateof reason",a
"transcendentalconditionofpossibility"formorality).
Second,in Kant'sapproach,freedomhasnothingto do with theagent's
searchfor happinessbut,quiteon thecontrary,with herdutyto actmorally.
Ibat meansthatwehavetoassumethatthemoralagentis freeto preserveher
autonomy,in otherwords,towarranthatshecangivetoherselfa ruleof con-
ductindependentlyof herinclinations.Freedomis notthecapacityto do what
we feellike doing;butthecapacitynotto do whatwe feel like doing.Ibis is




of happiness;thatlo acknowledgetheagent'sfreedomwill facilitateher ful-
fillmentof welfare.Unfortunately.sucha perspectivecorresponds,however,
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moreto aconsequentialistprogramof generalwelfarea laMill thantoaformal
universalistethicssuchasKantianis.
The factthatComellstraysflOmKantonthesetwoessentialpointsmust
bestressed,asit is a goodexampleof whathasbecomea tooreadilyaccepted
versionof Kant amongferninists.We maynow ask,in whatway is thecate-




not a secondaryissue;thatis, thattherearegoodreasonsto prefertheterm
"ethicalferninism"to themorecommon"feministethics".22For thenotionof
"feministethics"seemsto implythatthereis a typeof ethicsthatis feminist
andanothertype,whichwouldalsobe legitimateanddeservetobecalledeth-
ics,thatwould,however,notbeferninist.
It wouldthereforebepossibleto imaginesomethinglike a nonfeminist
ethics.In contrast,thenotionof "ethicalfeminism"is basedon theideathat
anymoraltheoryoughtto fulfill somerequisitesregardingthekind of treat-
mentthatwomenwouldobtainin suchperspective.In short,if it reallyis eth-
ics,thenis hastobefeminist. '
Now, giventhecomplexityofhumanaffairsandtheirintricaterelations,
theplOjectof ethicalfeminismacquiresitsuniquelOleby assumingasa theo-
reticalprioritytheneedlo analyzetheimplicationsthatanYmoraltheoryhas
for women,andalsobecauseit aspirestohelpdesignandimplementlabor,po-
litical, socialandjurídicalmeasuresto putanendto thestill toofrequentdis-
crirnination(it wouldberedundanttoadd"moral"here)ofwomen.
Furthermore,in thisconcretecase(theconstructionof a moralfeminism
a la Kant; thatis, universal)theexpression"ethicalfeminism"is favoredover
"feministethics"to emphasizethatit is not necessaryto startflOmthehy-
pothesisof anassumed ifferenceconcemingthemoralreasoningsandbehav-
iorsof eachgender,ascareethicssustains.We donotneedto assume ithera
specificallyfernininemodeof reasoningandmoralaction,noracorresponding
masculineversion.Instead,thestartingpointof "ethicalfeminism"is their-
relevanceof consideringtheagent'sgenderwhenjudginghis or hermoralac-
tion.Interestinglyenough,thisis notthesameassayingthattheanalysismust
be blind or indifferentto thegendersof theimpliedagents,for it is precisely
whenwe taketheminto accountthatasymmetriesin themoraltreatmentof
eachcomesto light.
221 takethis insight from Celia Amorós (2000):Presentación.In: Celia Amorós (Ed.)
Feminismo y filosofía. Madrid: Síntesis9-10.
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A formalruletbatisbotbradicallyuniversalistandstrictlyindividualizing
Certainly,Kant'smoralphilosophycanbe of muchrelevanceto tbefeminist
understandingof equality.Kant'streatmentoftbe relationshipbetweenhuman
goodandhumanfreedomservesto illustratetbekindof moraljustificationtbat




cidinghow to actmorallyright).In Kantianterms,tbeonly rightmotivefor
moralactionis duty,nottbesearchforhappiness.Evenifher ownhappinessis
nevera propermotivein moraldeliberation,tbeagentis nevertbelessobliged
to takeinto accountbeotber'shappiness.In fact,it is only by puttinginto
bracketsourinclinationslowardshappinesstbatwe exerciseOUT freedom,tbat




tbattbepromotionofa woman'shappinessbea reasonto act,23Naturally,this












andresourcesto promoteherself-determinatedi eaof welfareandhappiness
in life asdoesa manoIn tbisrespect,Kantianetbicsis beneficialfor feminism,
notonlybecauseit helpsdiagnoseawoundtbatis still open,butespeciallybe-
causeit contributesto thekind of conceptualandmoraltreatmentthatwould
benéededtohealit. Theappealtotbecategoricalimperativerevealsnumerous
defectsin tbetreatmentthatwomenobtainbasedon theirgender.This project
23 HqtaNagl-Docekal(1997):o.c.101-124.
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like would focuson the followingtwo essentialaspectsof themorallaw.24
First,thedutyto respectheendsthatothersdetennineforthemselves(aslong
astheyaresubjecto certainmorallimitations).In general,becauseofthe gen-
der roles assignedlo them,womenarepresentedwith limitedoptions,and
thereforeoffered less opportunitiesof personalfulfillment.For example,
women,unlikemen,mustfrequentlychoosebetweencareerandfamily,or are
forcedto enduregreatertensionsanddevotemoreeffortto maintainbothpro-
jectsthando men.To a largeextent,it is preciselyin relationlo bodymatters,
sexualidentity,maternity,andwork issuesthatwomengainor looseourright
to imaginewhowewanttobecome.
Second,thepreceptlo contributeto thefulfillmentof otherbeing'sself-
determinatedends.This aspectof thecategoricalimperativeforcesustoaskto
what extentwomen fmd supportin their individualsearchfor happiness.
Clearly,womendonothaveequalaccesslo theopportunitiesthattheydeserve.
It is in this contextthatpoliticalmeasureslike affirmativeactionandquota
regulationacquiretheirmoraljustification,as do attemptsto (ideally)assist









Undoubtedly,the inclusionof theother'sendsamongmy own is a beautiful
definitionof love,whichcanleadto furthermoralandpoliticalanalysisand
conclusions.However,it is still anopenquestionwhetherpoliticalactioncan
andshouldbebuiltuponthispremise.AfteraIl, it maybethattheethicalcon-
sequencescould(ornot)beconsideredanexcessiveduty.Butthatcanonlybe
thetopicof anotheressay.
24 Foramoredetailedaccountoftheapplicationofthecategoricalimperativetotheanalysis
ofhotgenderissues,seeRectaNagl-Docekal,o.c.
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